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Abstract
This paper synthesizes confirmation by instances and confirmation by
successful predictions, and thereby the Hempelian and the hypothetico-
deductive traditions in confirmation theory. Our merger of these two
approaches solves classical problems such as the tacking paradoxes and the
raven paradox and is subsequently extended to the piecemeal confirmation
of entire theories. We compare our proposal to rivalling suggestions and
discuss its merits and drawbacks, especially vis-a`-vis Bayesianism.
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1. Introduction
This article presents a synthesis of hypothetico-deductive (H-D) and Hempelian
confirmation and extends it to the piecemeal confirmation of entire theories.
Such a project may sound anachronistic in a time where purely qualitative,
first-order logic approaches in philosophy of science are considered a failure, and
apparently superseded by more powerful quantitative accounts such as Bayesian-
ism. Therefore, before actually embarking on the project itself, we consider it
necessary to devote some lines to why we believe that this is a fruitful endeavor
at all. (Readers who take this for granted are invited to skip a couple of para-
graphs.)
There is a popular prejudice that with the advent and success of Bayesianism,
qualitative accounts of confirmation have become obsolete. Bayesians model the
beliefs of scientists by means of probability functions, and explicate degree of
confirmation as the credibility boost that a tested hypothesis experiences in
the face of the evidence. This seems to be a general, encompassing model that
contains qualitative accounts as special cases.1
While we do not want to question the benefits of Bayesian reasoning for
modeling inductive inference, we doubt that it is a complete theory. For instance,
frequentist (rather than Bayesian) techniques still dominate uncertain reasoning
in science, and this state of the art has, by some philosophers, been defended on
methodological grounds (e.g., Mayo 1996). What is more, even those scientists
that subscribe, foundationally, to Bayesianism sometimes refrain from subjective
Bayesian inference because they do not consider it suitable for allegedly objective
scientific communication (e.g., Bernardo 2011).
The visible restraint of scientists and methodologists to fully endorse Bayesian-
ism fits the observation that increase in degree of belief is, in many cases in the
history of science, a poor explanation of why a piece of evidence confirms a the-
ory (Glymour 1980a). Think of Kepler’s laws and Tycho Brahe’s observations
of the orbit of Mars, Lavoisier’s refutation of the phlogiston theory in his ex-
periments on combustion, or the General Theory of Relativity and Eddington’s
observations of the 1919 eclipse. In these and similar cases, Bayesianism is,
rather than an explication of scientific confirmation, an instrument to measure
its extent : it neither explains in virtue of what we raise our degree of belief in
the tested theory, nor why scientists often show unanimous agreement on the
interpretation of an experiment.
1See Kuipers (2000) for an extended discussion of qualitative vs. Bayesian confirmation
theory.
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Clearly, Bayesianism is a very general and useful model of confirmation, and
we have no ambition to play the anti-Bayesian here. But the above arguments,
elaborated in much greater detail in the cited works, suggest that confirmation
might, like explanation, be a plural notion. Thus, even a die-hard Bayesian need
not dismiss the study of qualitative confirmation as superfluous. Quite to the
contrary, by studying qualitative accounts, we can get an idea of what scientists
refer to when talking about structural, objective relations between theory and
evidence, and unravel why Bayesian reasoning is still struggling to find its place
in many areas of science.
There are two grand traditions in qualitative confirmation theory. One
prominent proposal for the structure of scientific confirmation has been made
by William Whewell:
Our hypotheses ought to foretel phenomena which have not yet been
observed [. . . ] the truth and accuracy of these predictions were a
proof that the hypothesis was valuable and, at least to a great extent,
true. (Whewell 1847, 62-63)
Modeling empirical support by successful (deductive) prediction is the bottom
line of the hypothetico-deductive model of confirmation. From the hypothesis un-
der test and some auxiliary assumptions, we derive empirical predictions that
confirm, if verified, the original hypothesis. For instance, a physicist will test the
harmonic oscillator model captured by the equation x¨ + ω2x = 0 for swinging
pendula by deriving its consequences for a particular pendulum. If the predic-
tions of the oscillator model are verified, they confirm the harmonic oscillator
model, if not, they refute it.
Moreover, the H-D model resembles the “conjectures and refutations”-model
of scientific progress (Popper 1934/71): hypothesis have to be subjected to se-
vere tests in order to gain corroboration. This fact distinguishes it among all
qualitative accounts of confirmation. It is thereby an attractive model for those
who are reluctant to assign degrees of belief in the truth of any particular hy-
pothesis (a presumption of Bayesianism) but who believe that by subjecting a
hypothesis to severe tests and failing to observe refutations, it can be corrobo-
rated and appraised over others.
The other grand tradition is confirmation by instances, or, for the sake of
convenience, Hempelian confirmation. This goes back to Jean Nicod (1925)
who modeled l’induction par confirmation as the discovery of instances of a
hypothesis under test. See also Glymour (1980a). Planet orbits are instances
of Kepler’s laws. Swinging pendula instantiate the harmonic oscillator. Black
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ravens instantiate the hypothesis that all ravens are black. Hempel (1945/65)
provided the first rigorous formalization of this idea by demanding that the
evidence entail the development of the hypothesis to the domain of the evidence.
This is quite different from the H-D account where the deductive arrow goes
from the hypothesis to the evidence. Apparently, both approaches pursue very
different accounts of confirmation, suggesting that it might be hard to come up
with a unified account of qualitative confirmation.
Nevertheless, this is the project we undertake. The next section presents a
couple of pertinent objections that impair either account. After arguing that
these problems can be overcome by integrating a Hempelian and a H-D perspec-
tive on scientific confirmation, we generalize our account to the confirmation of
networks of hypotheses, that is, scientific theories. We do not pretend to have
solved all problems of qualitative confirmation theory and to have evaded all ob-
jections that have plagued previous accounts, but judging our proposal from its
conceptual soundness, simplicity, and viability in paradigmatic cases, we think
that a good case has been made. We conclude by arguing that it improves on
previous suggestions and introduces a novel and interesting twist to theorizing
about scientific confirmation.
2. Classical Problems for Qualitative Accounts
Classical formulations of H-D confirmation such as
(H-D) Evidence E H-D confirms hypothesis H relative to back-
ground knowledge K if and only if (1) H.K is consistent, (2) H.K
entails E and (3) K alone does not entail E.
have several severe shortcomings. First, we often want to say that the results
of a scientific experiment do not only support an isolated hypothesis, but speak
in favor of an entire theory consisting of several interrelated models or theo-
ries (Dietrich and Moretti 2005). (H-D) does not specify how entire theories,
or major parts thereof, are confirmed, as opposed to the confirmation of single
hypotheses. Second, (H-D) is unable to cope with the so-called tacking para-
doxes. It is possible to tack irrelevant conjunctions to the hypothesis H and
to preserve the confirmation relation: If H is confirmed by a piece of evidence
E relative to K, H.X is confirmed by the same E relative to K, as long as X
is consistent with H.K. To use our initial example: If the predictions of the
harmonic oscillator model about a swinging pendulum are verified, they would
also confirm the harmonic oscillator model of the pendulum together with the
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hypothesis that all ravens are black. That is unacceptable. Vice versa, it is
possible to tack irrelevant disjunctions to the evidence E and to preserve the
confirmation relation: If E confirms a hypothesis H relative to K, E ∨ E′ con-
firms the same H for an arbitrary E′, relative to K. So, equally unacceptably,
the pendulum data or the observation of a single black raven would confirm
that swinging pendula are harmonic oscillators. Both objections exploit the
fact that any prediction, however partial it is, still counts as confirming, or in
other words: classical H-D confirmation gives no account of evidential relevance.
These failures of hypothetico-deductive confirmation might lead to the conclu-
sion that the entire approach is hopeless and should be abandoned (Glymour
1980b).
Hempelian confirmation (Hempel 1945/65), on the other hand, is usually
identified with the satisfaction criterion:
(Hempel) Evidence E (directly) Hempel-confirms hypothesis H rel-
ative to background knowledge K if and only if E.K entails the
development of H for E, that is, the restriction of H to the set of
singular terms that occur essentially in E.2 Formally, the criterion
amounts to E.K |= H|E .
However, (Hempel) is exposed to equally strong, perhaps devastating criti-
cism. (Hempel) is monotonous with respect to background knowlege, that is,
the addition of more background knowledge cannot destroy the confirmation
relation. This can lead to disastrous consequences. Consider the hypothesis
H = ∀x : (Rx→ Bx) that all ravens are black, and the evidence E = ¬Ba.¬Ra
that we observe a non-black non-raven. Hempel (1945/65) makes a convincing
case that such a piece of evidence may confirm the raven hypothesis as long
as we do not know beforehand that a is no raven: such observations rule out
potential counterexamples to the raven hypothesis. For instance, if we observe
a grey bird that resembles a raven, then finding out that it was a crow confirms
the raven hypothesis.
However, Hempel’s own account of confirmation is inconsistent with this
analysis (Fitelson and Hawthorne 2010): relative to the background knowledge
K = ¬Ra (“a is no raven”), E.K = ¬Ba.¬Ra implies H|E = (Ra → Ba).
Although the color of birds known to be crows or swans cannot tell us anything
about the truth of the raven hypothesis, E Hempel-confirms H relative to K in
this example, creating a clearly unacceptable confirming instance.
2Definition 2 will make this notion precise; see Hempel (1943) for the original definition.
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Finally, it is worrying that Hempelian confirmation is so silent about the well-
entrenched idea that hypotheses are confirmed by successful predictions. Given
the significance of that approach both in scientific practice and in philosophical
theorizing, it is awkward that (Hempel) remains silent on that point. The
remainder of the paper is devoted to tackling the problems outlined in this
section.
3. Irrelevant Disjunctions: Content Parts
The source of the problem of irrelevant disjunction is the property of first-order
logic that well-formed forms (wffs) sometimes have irrelevant consequences: for
instance, the conclusion in Fa |= (Fa ∨ Ga) contains the irrelevant element
Ga. We need a logical relation stronger than deductive entailment to discern
irrelevant disjuncts. For the sake of simplicity, we presuppose a first order
predicate language L without identity, but the extensions are straightforward.3
Ken Gemes’ (1993) account of content parts achieves that goal by analyzing
relevance relations between wffs. The following definition captures our intuitive
view of relevance relations between two wffs:
Definition 1 An atomic well-formed form (wff) β is relevant to a wff α if and
only if there is some model M of α such that: if M ′ differs from M only in the
value β is assigned, M ′ is not a model of α.
Intuitively, β is relevant for α if at least in one model of α the truth value of
β cannot be changed without making α false. In other words, the truth value
of α is not fully independent of the truth value of β. A particularly interesting
application of this account of relevance is the notion of the domain and the
development of a wff.
Definition 2 The domain of a well-formed formula α is the set of singular
terms that occur in the atomic wffs that are relevant for α. The development of
a universally quantified wff α for another wff β, written α|β, is the restriction
of α to the domain of β, that is, we evaluate the truth value of α with respect
to the domain of β.
For instance, the domain of Fa.Fb is {a, b} whereas the domain of Fa.Ga is
{a}, and the development of ∀x : Fx for Fa.¬Gb is Fa.Fb.
Moreover, we can define the notion of a relevant model which assigns truth
values to all and only the relevant atomic wffs:
3A generalization of the content part relation to richer languages that can be used for H-D
confirmation, e.g. languages with identity, is given in Gemes (1997).
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Definition 3 A relevant model of a wff α is a model of α that assigns truth
values to all and only those atomic wffs that are relevant to α.
So relevant models remain silent on the truth values of irrelevant atomic
wffs. This allows us to define the notion of a content part, where in addition
to logical entailment, all relevant models of the consequens can be extended to
relevant models of the antecedens:
Definition 4 For two wffs α and β, β is a content part of α (α |=cp β) if
and only if (1) α and β are contingent, (2) α logically entails β and (3) every
relevant model of β has an extension which is a relevant model of α.
The content part relation forbids irrelevant disjunctions in the conclusion.
For instance, Fa ∨Ga is no content part of Fa because the model that assigns
‘false’ to Fa and ‘true’ to Ga is a relevant model of Fa ∨Ga, but no model of
Fa. The content part relation marks such deductions as irrelevant. Following
Gemes (1993), we can improve on our original definition of H-D confirmation
by postulating
(H-D*) Evidence E H-D confirms hypothesis H relative to back-
ground knowledge K if and only if (1) H.K is consistent, (2) E is a
content part of H.K (H.K |=cp E) and (3) K alone does not entail
E.
4. Irrelevant Conjunctions: Synthesizing Hempel and H-D
Unfortunately, (H-D*) does not solve all tacking paradoxes: the problem of
irrelevant conjunctions persists. The pendulum data still confirm the hypothesis
that pendula are harmonic oscillators and that all ravens are black. To rule out
these problems, Gemes (1993) has taken refuge in a quite complicated account
of natural axiomatizations of a theory.
That strategy has its merits, but also its drawbacks (Schurz 2005). First, it is
not always clear which axiomatizations should count as “natural” and which not.
Second, Gemes’ account is rather complicated and hard to interpret intuitively.
Keeping in mind Carnap’s (1950, §3) requirement that explications should be
as simple as possible, we might decide to look for alternatives. Unfortunately,
the available suggestions (e.g., Schurz 1991) are not without problems either
(Gemes 1998).
We propose to combine content parts and modus tollens in order to discern
irrelevant conjunctions. The basic idea of H-D confirmation – that E is a pre-
diction of H – can be expressed in two ways: H |= E and ¬E |= ¬H. The latter
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formulation states that failure to observe a prediction refutes a hypothesis, or
in other words, the evidence has to put the hypothesis to a serious test. If we
qualify this entailment by means of content parts and restrict it to the domain
of the evidence – that is, the set of singular terms that are relevant to E –, then
the problem of irrelevant conjunctions is solved by demanding that
¬E.K |=cp ¬H|E .K. (1)
If H is the compound of a ‘relevant’ and an ‘irrelevant’ hypothesis, then the
content part relation will not hold between ¬E.K and ¬H|E .K, because the
irrelevant conjunctions have been transformed into irrelevant disjunctions. For
example, ifH = ∀x : (Fx.Gx), E = Fa, andK = >, then ¬H|E .K = ¬Fa∨¬Ga
is no content part of ¬E.K = ¬Fa.
(1) can also be interpreted as a Hempelian requirement on successful confir-
mation. The problem of irrelevant conjunctions occurs when evidence produces
only partial instances of a hypothesis: Fa is no instance of H = ∀x : (Fx.Gx),
etc. Since Hempel’s satisfaction criterion required that E be a full instance of
H, it did not suffer from that problem. Our move in (1) accounts for that intu-
ition and exploits that if E is no instance of H, such as in the above irrelevant
conjunction case, then ¬H|E .K will typically be no content part of ¬E.K.
Hence, we can suggest a definition of qualitative confirmation that synthe-
sizes Hempelian and H-D confirmation:
(Syn) Evidence E confirms hypothesis H relative to background
knowledge K if and only if
• E is a content part of H.K (H.K |=cp E), and
• ¬H|E .K is a content part of ¬E.K (¬E.K |=cp ¬H|E .K).
(Syn) successfully copes with the tacking paradoxes, and in doing so, it
improves upon classical H-D confirmation as well as upon Hempel’s proposal.
For instance, in the raven paradox, both E1 = Ba and E2 = ¬Ra confirm
H = ∀x : (Rx → Bx), relative to K1 = Ra and K2 = ¬Ba, respectively. This
is in line with Hempel’s resolution of the paradox, namely to bite the bullet.
But notably, H is no more confirmable by known non-ravens whose color is
subsequently observed, as it used to be the case in Hempel’s own account.
Nicod, Hempel and Glymour were right about the significance of instances for
the confirmation of a hypothesis – they did not see, though, the prospects of
marrying that view with hypothetico-deductive confirmation.
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(Syn) does not yet explain how different parts of a theory can be confirmed by
a body of composite evidence. This feature of (Syn) is particularly salient if we
examine the behavior of that account with respect to the confirmation of several
hypotheses at once. Assume that a biologist conducts a couple of experiments
with a cell culture. Unfortunately, she can use each cell only once, that is, for
one experiment. Reasonably, she partitions the cell culture into different groups
and performs experiment A with group 1, experiment B with group 2, and
so on. If the experiments are successful, they should, taken together, confirm
the conjunction of the hypotheses. In other words, if E1 confirms H1 and E2
confirms H2, then E1.E2 should also confirm H1.H2.
Unfortunately, our present account violates that desideratum. For instance,
E = Fa.Gb will not confirm the hypothesis H = ∀x : (Fx.Gx) relative to
K = >. Thus, while (Syn) synthesizes Hempelian and H-D confirmation, we
are lacking an extension where the confirmation of independent hypotheses can
add up to the confirmation of an entire theory which is composed of the former.
5. An Extension to Theory Confirmation
For extending (Syn) to the confirmation of entire theories, we let ourselves once
more inspire by Hempel’s approach. For Hempel, a theory is confirmed if it is
entailed by a set of sentences that are individually confirmed by the evidence.
Following this idea, we propose to construct a 1:1-match of theory and evidence:
theories are decomposed into their content parts which are, individually, con-
firmed by a specific content part of the evidence. If all content parts of the
theory are confirmed in this way, the entire theory is confirmed. For example,
assume that we would like to confirm Kepler’s Three Laws by means of observ-
ing the planetary orbits in the solar system. Then we use the position of a
single planet at different points in time to confirm the first two laws, whereas
we require data about the orbital period and the semi-major axis of at least two
different planets in order to confirm the Third Law.
Furthermore, by building on the (Syn) criterion from the previous section,
we avoid the tacking paradoxes. In other words, we stipulate that evidence E
confirms a theory T if (i) we can derive that evidence from the theory (relative
to background knowledge), and (ii) there is a decomposition of T into content
parts H1, . . . ,Hn such that for each Hi, the evidence contains an instance of
Hi.
We can condense this reasoning into the following definition:
Definition 5 Evidence E confirms theory T relative to background knowledge
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K if and only if
• E is a content part of T.K (T.K |=cp E)
• There are wffs H1, . . . ,Hn such that H1, . . . ,Hn |= T and for all i ≤ n,
T |=cp Hi, and there is a wff Ei such that
– E |=cp Ei
– ¬Ei.K |=cp ¬(Hi)|Ei .K, that is, ¬(Hi)|Ei .K is a content part of
¬Ei.K.
To illustrate how definition 5 works, consider a medical trial. We would like
to test the theory T that only plasmodium parasites cause malaria in humans.
More precisely, the theory consists of the individual hypotheses H1, H2, H3, etc.
that only plasmodium parasites can cause the different forms of malaria M1, M2,
M3. We test these hypothesis by scrutinizing patients that have been suffering of
malaria, sorting them into subtrials according to the kind of malaria Mi. If the
individual trials confirm the hypothesis (T.K |=cp E, ¬Ei.K |=cp ¬(Hi)|Ei .K),
then we have also confirmed our overarching theory, since the evidence of each
trial Ei is a content part of the total evidence. Furthermore, definition 5 solves
our biologist’s problem: if two different properties (F and G) are supposed to
be demonstrated of a population, we can decompose the composite hypothesis
∀x : Fx.Gx into its content parts ∀x : Fx and ∀x : Gx, each of which is
confirmed by a content part of the evidence (Fa and Gb).
Summing up, Definition 5 has a number of desirable implications. It solves
the tacking paradoxes, gives an account of how entire theories can be confirmed
in a piecemeal fashion, and does so using only a single technical concept: content
part entailment, a refinement of deductive entailment. A fortiori, we can also
apply it to the confirmation of single hypotheses.
6. Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we have synthesized Hempelian and H-D confirmation, that is,
confirmation by instances and confirmation by successful predictions. We have
contended that the reputation of qualitative confirmation as either hopeless
or outdated is unjustified: it captures important structural relations between
theory and evidence, and it can be immunized against the classical objections.
The main competitor on the quantitative side – Bayesianism – is an attractive
framework for modeling learning under uncertainty, but it does not fully explain
why degrees of belief are changed in a certain way, why scientists agree so
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often on the confirmatory status of a specific experiment. Therefore, qualitative
confirmatory arguments have a place in scientific reasoning.
By integrating Hempelian confirmation into the hypothetico-deductive ac-
count, we have solved the tacking paradoxes, extended our account to the confir-
mation of entire theories, and retained a convincing solution to the ravens’ para-
dox. However, marrying the two has consequences that one may find unattrac-
tive, too. Confirming existential statements, and universal statements without
finite models remains difficult.4
Another objection would contend that our account is limited to theories
with purely observational content: since the evidence must be stated in terms
of observational properties, it is hard to see how ¬H|E (that may refer to un-
observable properties) can ever be a content part of ¬E. For instance, suppose
that an electron is shot into an electromagnetic field. It will then experience a
Lorentz force and change its direction accordingly. Then, ¬H|E seems to be a
disjunction of an observable and a non-observable proposition. So it cannot be
a content part of the (purely observational) ¬E.
This objection is only valid if there are no logical inference relations between
unobservable and observable properties. But if the electron experiences an elec-
tromagnetic force, it will be deflected orthogonally to its original direction and
to the electromagnetic force lines. This follows directly from the formula for the
Lorentz force ~F = q (~v × ~B). Conversely, if the electron fails to move in that
direction, we can infer that there cannot have been an (unobservable) Lorentz
force, and we can infer from ¬E to ¬H|E . Thus, the proposal also applies to
theories with partly unobservable content.
On a whole, our proposal is simpler and more straightforward than the
rivalling suggestions of Gemes (1993) and Schurz (1991), and it gives a satis-
factory treatment of paradigmatic problems such as the tacking paradoxes, the
raven paradox, and the confirmation of entire theories. We don’t say that it
is entirely unproblematic, we don’t say that contrived counterexamples cannot
be constructed. Still, we conclude that our account makes a considerable net
surplus: we are now able to reconcile two conflicting intuitions and to explain
why successful predictions and instances of an hypothesis both have confirma-
tory force, while at the same time solving the classical paradoxes and modeling
the piecemeal confirmation of entire theories.
4Moreover, a hypothesis such as H = ∀x, y : Rxy is not confirmed by Rab relative to
tautologous background knowledge because Rab does not constitute a full instance of H. For
that, we would require to observe Raa, Rba, and Rbb as well. Thus, one may ask whether
the intuitive pull of confirmation by instances applies to monadic predicates only – a question
that is left to future work.
11
References
Bernardo, Jose´ M. (2011): “Integrated Objective Bayesian Estimation and Hy-
pothesis Testing” (with discussion), in J. M. Bernardo et al. (eds.): Bayesian
Statistics 9: Proceedings of the Ninth Valencia International Meeting, 1–68.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Carnap, Rudolf (1950): Logical Foundations of Probability. Chicago: The Uni-
versity of Chicago Press.
Dietrich, Franz, and Luca Moretti (2005): “On Coherent Sets and the Trans-
mission of Confirmation”, Philosophy of Science 72, 403–424.
Fitelson, Branden, and James Hawthorne (2010): “How Bayesian Confirmation
Theory Handles the Paradox of the Ravens”, in: Ellery Eells and James Fetzer
(ed.), The Place of Probability in Science, 247–276. New York: Springer.
Gemes, Ken (1993): “Hypothetico-Deductivism, Content and the Natural Ax-
iomatisation of Theories”, Philosophy of Science 60, 477–487.
Gemes, Ken (1997): “A New Theory of Content II: Model Theory and Some
Alternatives”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 26, 449–476.
Gemes, Ken (1998): “Hypothetico-Deductivism: The Current State of Play”,
Erkenntnis 49, 1–20.
Gemes, Ken (2006): “Content and Watkins’ Account of Natural Axiomatiza-
tions”, dialectica 60, 85–92.
Glymour, Clark (1980a): Theory and Evidence. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Glymour, Clark (1980b): “Discussion: Hypothetico-Deductivism is Hopeless”,
Philosophy of Science 47, 322–325.
Hempel, Carl G. (1943): “A Purely Syntactical Definition of Confirmation”,
Journal of Symbolic Logic 8, 122–143.
Hempel, Carl G. (1945/65): “Studies in the Logic of Confirmation”, in: Aspects
of Scientific Explanation, 3-46. The Free Press, New York. Reprint from Mind
54, 1945.
Kuipers, Theo (2000): From Instrumentalism to Constructive Realism. Dor-
drecht: Kluwer.
12
Mayo, Deborah G. (1996): Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge.
Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
Nicod, Jean (1925): Le proble`me logique de l’induction. Paris: Alcan.
Popper, Karl R. (1934/71): Logik der Forschung. Third Edition. Tu¨bingen:
Mohr.
Schurz, Gerhard (1991): “Relevant Deduction”, Erkenntnis 35, 391-437.
Schurz, Gerhard (2005): “Bayesian H-D Confirmation and Structuralistic
Truthlikeness: Discussion and Comparison with the Relevant-Element and
the Content-Part Approach”, in: Roberto Festa (ed.), Logics of Scientific Dis-
covery. Essays in Debate with Theo Kuipers, 141–159. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Whewell, William (1847): Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Founded Upon
Their History. Vol. II. London: Parker.
13
